CAN BALKANS BECOME A SECURITY COMMUNITY
WITH THE HELP OF
COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY?

Paper presented at the Portoroz meeting of the
ESCADA PROJECT
Group A
(Oct. 3-6, 2002)

Coordinated by
Center for European Security Studies, Groningen

If regional cooperation and integration are taken as criteria, the Balkans still do not exist as a region, in the strict sense of the word. Regardless of the way in which one measures it, or the domains one has in sight, the level of co-operation and integration among states is lower than in any other region of contemporary Europe.

Genuine bottom-up initiatives for cooperation and integration are still rare, and major results are mostly lacking. If, luckily, weapons don't talk any more, at least not so loudly, mutual suspicion, and very often hollow promises give the flavour of mutual relations. Cooperation and integration are still more part of broader agendas of outside actors (EU, NATO), which are at the same time the guarantors of security and peace in the region, than of local actors and their activities. Cooperation and integration have also become the key component of the EU conditionality policy vis a vis the accession and the prospect of further economic aid, and they function mostly on this background.

Despite some improvements that have been made in the last two or three years, we should be well aware of the challenges and dangers that in the future might push the Balkans away from the desired outcome, i.e. into the direction of less and not more cooperation.

In order to show how this unwelcome trend might be reversed, I'll first describe the Balkans in two ways, using a popular symbol and a concept from political science, and then I'll suggest a two-tier perspective from which the lack of cooperation and integration might be solved. Finally, I´ll sketch a possible role that EU common security and defence policy (CESDP) could have in this process.

From one Balkan bridge to another

The best way to describe the improvement, or the difference with the situation of several years ago, is to use the image of bridges as symbols of connections of peoples, cultures, individuals (an idea developed by Ivo Andric - the only Nobel laureate for literature from the Balkans). In a way, during the last few years, we can say that we have moved from the river Neretva to the river Danube, i.e. from the Old Bridge in Mostar to the Kalafat-Vidin bridge between Bulgaria and Romania, on the Danube. The destruction of the former bridge in the Bosnian war had nothing to do with reasons coming from military strategy, which is why it could be taken as a pure symbol of all wars on ex-Yugoslav territory during the 1990s. Understood in this context, it is a symbol of intolerance and hatred, or of the wish of some Balkan nations to annihilate each other. This is hopefully something we have left behind us, as a state of mind, as national strategy or as a way to search for the solution of conflicts. Following a turn to democracy in all Balkan states, coupled with prolongued efforts of the international community to secure peace, stability and development in the region, we have good reasons to hope that this part of the recent past will not become our future.

All those changes notwithstanding, we are still however stuck somewhere around the Kalafat-Vidin bridge, if one wants to keep playing with the same symbol. As is well-known, this bridge in fact does not exist yet, except in blueprints. Its construction, or better said the decision on the place where it was supposed to be built, became a matter of grand controversy between Bulgaria and Romania in the 1990s. Those two countries wasted eight long years trying to agree on the exact place where to build the bridge in future. After all that time they failed to agree, and the decision had to arrive from Brussels. This is where we are now and this is who we are.

In peaceful times, between two countries without problems in mutual relations, between the only two EU and NATO candidates from the Balkans, seemingly determined to prove their commitment to values and principles of Euro-Atlantic integration, it's difficult to find a better example of the lack of cooperation in something that is apparently very practical and in the best interest of both sides. There is, namely, no other bridge hundreds of kilometres up or down the Danube.

Balkans as a security community

Another way to describe the same state of affairs is to use the familiar concept of "security community", elaborated in political science by Karl Deutsch. In the case of today's Balkans it seems appropriate to ask whether Balkans can be labelled a "pluralistic security communitty", in the context of Deutsch's theory. According to Deutsch, within this kind of community, there is a "real assurance that members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way". Criteria for that kind of community are obviously very basic and low and do not envisage high degrees of cooperation and integration. Borrowing from some interpretations of Deutsch's theory, we could name it a "nascent" phase of security community, that could be followed in future by the "ascending" and "mature" phases. While the EU or NATO of today could be interpreted in terms of mature security communities, the desirable goal for the Balkans - just out of wars and traditionally without significant cooperation and integration - would be to lay grounds for the nascent security community.

There are three essential conditions for that kind of "basic" security community. The first one is compatibility of values among decision makers, the second is mutual predictability of behaviour among decision makers of units to be integrated, and the third one is mutual responsiveness - the ability to work closely together in timely fashion to address pressing issues. While none of them seems to be fully present in the Balkans today, the first one is least difficult to reach. There is already a high degree of compatibility of values across the Balkan political spectrum - a phenomenon that echoes both democratic transformations of the states involved, as well as their common desire for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Functionalism and beyond

To move from common vision (still not fully in place) to common behaviour, as the other two mentioned conditions demand, is far from easy, not only in the Balkans. A strategy often proposed these days could be labelled "functionalism". Put simply, it strongly suggests that Balkan states should copy a strategy for cooperation and integration that was put forward by the European Coal and Steel Community, at the very beginning of the European integration, half a century ago. Repeating this experience would mean putting away all grand schemes and big political phrases and plans, and insist instead on economic cooperation between the Balkan countries. In other words, turning to something very concrete, very practical and in the interest of everybody, of all sides included. It is to be expected, the argument goes, that such an approach would promote not only deeper economic cooperation and integration, but - equally important - cooperation and integration in political matters and in security. In fact, within such an such an approach economic cooperation is political in nature, as was the case in Western Europe at the beginning of the 1950s. Economic cooperation is the means of achieving political goals - transforming the Balkans into security community.

Advantages of the proposed strategy are obvious, and they would be an important novelty in this part of the world. The spill-over effects on political and security cooperation among Balkan states would certainly promote stability throughout the region and help bigger foreign investments, as well as easier EU integration. There's a danger, however, that the "big picture" - or the pan-Balkan perspective is blurred or marginalized in this way, and that's why this should be only one out of two steps that should be done, in my opinion. One of the reasons for this is a different situation that we have in the Balkans today in comparison with the post-Second World War situation in Western Europe.

First of all, legacies of conflicts are not the same. Although the French-German relations from the past can be compared with some patterns of conflicts among Balkan states, the intensity and the magnitude have been much stronger in the latter case. There's also a problem of the number of divisions the Balkans of today is a victim of. In addition to the number of historical (ethnic, cultural, religious…) division lines from the past, new ones are being created, too. The agendas of different Balkan states and societies differ and are not always compatible, even if seen in the context of the next several years.

One of the new divisions is between the EU and NATO candidate countries, on one side, and the Western Balkan countries, on the other. While some of the countries are only months away from invitation to join NATO, other countries have not joined the Council of Europe yet. This is a very important aspect that has to be taken seriously into account and that can have far-reaching consequences for the inter-state relations in the region.

In most countries we also have two specific features of the poscommunist transition: it is, namely, intertwined with underdevelopment and with the unfinished nation- and state building. This in turn influences security in a considerable way, despite multiple international efforts and despite so many NATO troops around. An important aspect of the continuing nation- and state building is that many borders in the Balkans have not been universally recognized as unchangeable by partites involved, but are instead contested from several sides and in many ways. Last but not least, the very nature of the states we are speaking about in the Balkans is very different from the states we could find in Western Europe at the beginning of the 1950s, or in Central Europe now, for that matter. Most states in our region are still plagued with weak and unfunctioning institutions and with the threatening lack of the rule of law.

The message from such grim picture would be that functionalism alone, as a strategy for regional cooperation, is unfortunately not able to deal with all those problems and to address them in a proper way. Another parallel view is still needed, one that would keep the "big picture" in focus, and that would not refrain from a grand strategy for the Balkans as a whole.

The formula seems to have been found in the Stability Pact, but not without controversies. Despite improvements made lately and largely connected with the change on the top of this institution, the stress on the main task of the SP, proposed by the new Coordinator in March of this year, could have possible unexpected consequences, i.e. disintegrative consequences, too. With this change of focus, Stability Pact turned almost completely, and limited itself to the Stabilization and Association Process, thus transforming the Pact from a pan-Balkan to a mere Western Balkan organization. Bulgaria and Romania have consequently been marginalized. There are, to be sure, good reasons for that, since those two countries are - unlike others from the region - the only NATO and EU candidates, and have already been following a different model of EU integration. The question is, however, will the cooperation and integration among the Western Balkan countries (and then among all Balkan countries) be improved if the advanced neighbors Bulgaria and Romania are gradually leaving the previously common scene.

Future challenges

This could be only one important sign of the near future which will move new NATO and EU borders directly into the Balkans. With Bulgaria and Romania very probably soon in NATO, one should not expect any drammatic change of the security situation in South East Europe, so neither its improvement nor its deterioration. NATO has already been present on the territory of Western Balkan countries, and - judging from the experiences of the first three post-communist members of NATO - it will not be present in Bulgaria and Romania with troops from other countries. The effect will be felt, however, in the missed opportunity for a radically improved security cooperation between the Balkan countries. Faced with a long list of tasks as new NATO members, Bulgaria and Romania might have neither the capacities, nor the interest to pursue many security-related and NATO-supported regional initiatives they have been not only part of, but have been launching and cultivating them.

On the positive side, chances for security cooperation in the region could in the meantime increase with FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia becoming PfP members. When this happens (according to optimistic scenarios during 2003), all states would find themselves within the Euro-Atlantic wider community, but not in the security community proper. It would rather be the beginning of the end of the establishment of the nascent phase of some future security community between the South East European States. Armed conflicts between states that are all part of the wider NATO family would be difficult to imagine, primarely because there would be various mechanisms at disposal in such framework to prevent the expansion of an eventual crisis. However, the mere lack of open conflicts should not be equated with cooperation and integration. One cannot help fear that Greek-Turkish instable and cooperation-free relations (within NATO!) might become a pattern for relations between many countries in the Balkan region.

Two factors will contribute to this state of affairs. First, some Balkan actors might contínue to feel that the demand for security cooperation is an assignment that comes primarely from above rather from below (from international actors rather than from domestic political actors). Such a direction of demands could generate resistance, or at least undermine efforts. The state of international protectorate that a good part of the Balkans has been in for years now could thus become an obstacle in these endevours even for communities that had long waited for the involvement of international community (like Albanians or Bosniaks). In addition, once in PfP, and without realistic chances to progress further towards full membership in the Alliance, or to expect rewards for progress made, their motivation to keep the cooperation growing might significatnly decline.

By the time the whole scene is set, probably two years from now, we shall all find ourselves amidst the new wave of rows dealing with the final status of Kosovo and Montenegro. Both questions will inevitably come on the agenda, with the likelyhood of being closely connected, and they will again involve the whole region. Despite many positive things that are bound to happen in other areas, like the expected achievements within the EU Stabilisation and Association Process, for instance, the status issues will project their own share of destabilization throughout the region. This might again motivate countries nearer to EU membership at that time (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) to try to decrease their ties with other Balkan countries, instead of increasing them.

For all these reasons, the two-tier strategy for regional cooperation in the Balkans should be preserved, and its first result should be transformation of the Balkans into a nascent security community.

CESDP and security community in the Balkans

Could CESDP have some role in this? Is it capable of making a difference in transforming the Balkans into a security community? Is EU itself part of the solution or part of the problem vis a vis an enhanced security cooperation between Balkan countries? Since CESDP is still mainly a vision than a reality, it is difficult to make clear-cut conclusions at this stage. Some elements of the answer can be, despite all that, certainly offered.

Judging from formal decisions of the highest EU institutions, CESDP is high on the EU agenda in the next several years. Member states have repeatedly committed themselves to developing a common foreign and defence policy, and consequently CESDP based on it, despite reservations coming from several capitals. Although without having been among the major ideas of the European Community so far (except at the very beginning), this policy is officially presented now as a logical continuation of the EU integration, as well as a substantial need for the time to come.

In the same way it used to be a trigger for the building of EU security posture in the 1990s, South East Europe is going to be the first consumer of CESDP, as well. In late autumn of 2002 in Macedonia EU is going to take over security role that NATO forces have been performing so far, and from the beginning of 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU Police Mission (EUPM) is to replace the existing United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF). One might suppose even now that these two missions will to a great degree determine the shape and the future of the EU policy in this domain. They will be an important test and that´s why they are of big significance to the European Union.

How can CESDP be seen from the perspective of the security community building in the Balkans? If, as it was already stated, we suppose that the compatibility of values - as the first condition for the establishing of the security community - is almost at hand, the question is how the remaining two conditions could be fulfilled. And these are mutual predictability of behavior and mutual responsiveness - the ability to work closely together, in timely fashion, to address pressing issues.

It´s highly unlikely that only one particular strategy, or one particular international organization could be of help to Balkan countries in this. As for the strategy, it has to cross-cut traditional divisions of work between security, political and economic considerations. In other parts of the postcommunist universe - most notably in Central Europe - there´s no need to address simultaneously all three areas. Due to the lack of problems in the security sphere, or in the sphere of political cooperation, the stress on economy might well be enough to produce good results. The Balkan knot is different exactly in this respect. Because of the described type of problems the Balkans is faced with, all three mentioned areas are closely intertwined and cannot be tackled independently. Security cooperation couldn´t thus proceed much further independently if not accompanied by an orchestrated set of measures in other fields.

The same goes for the international institutional framework, or in other words the choice of international organizations suitable for the enhancement of security cooperation. Relying only on one of them hasn´t got us too far and will not get us much further in the future either. The involvement of NATO is the case in point. Its South East Europe Initiative (SEEI), launched at the Washington Summit in May 1999, is still at the very beginning. Following the adoption of the ambitious SEECAP (South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities) in May 2001, the activities in the SEEGROUP (South East Europe Security Cooperation Group) have concentrated on two issues: exchange of border security personnel and the preparation of the comparative study of national security strategies. Important as they are, and coupled with activities of SEDM (South East Europe Defence Ministerial) and others, they are hardly enough, on the background of the problems that particularly Western Balkan countries are facing.

Partnership for Peace is still lacking two members from the Balkans (FR Yugoslavia and Bosnia), which prevents it to fully develop all of its potentials and advantages in this respect. Equally important, however, is the fact that PfP has not induced more direct cooperation between its members from the same region on bilateral or multilateral basis. It is still to be seen whether it will do that once FRY and Bosnia are in. In order to move from a general political forum for security cooperation, and the meeting place of its members with NATO members, PfP should build this part of its identity, as well.

Stability Pact, for its part, made a progress in the areas of political cooperation that involve security issues too. This was especially obvious in the revival of the SEECP (South East European Cooperation Process), which sent for the first time the representative of the rotating chair to the Brussels-based Informal Consultative Committee. In October 2000 the Stability Pact partners established RACVIAC (Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre) in Zagreb, in order to foster a broad security dialogue and promote arms control and confidence building measures. A Regional Clearinghouse for Small Arms and Light Weapons, operated by UNDP, was opened in Belgrade in May 2002, to help stem the illicit flow of such weaponry. Through several programs of its own, OSCE has been also engaged in the region in similar activities.

EU Macedonian and Bosnian missions will represent a qualitative leap forward for this organization´s involvement in the region, not as much as the general engagement is concerned, but more in terms of EU getting in charge for the first time. It has been present in security-related Balkan missions in many ways so far and is currently the main contributor to KFOR and SFOR. Will the Macedonian and Bosnian missions finally make true J. Poss´ famous statement that "the hour of Europe has finally arrived"? This, prediction made at the very beginning of the 1990s, turned out to be overoptimistic and unapliccable in the following years of the Yugoslav crisis. EU showed that it was not capable of formulating and executing a common foreign and security policy, and consequently engaging itself successfully in conflict management and conflict resolution. With the new turn towards these goals in recent years, hopes are rising that it might be capable for such missions independently of NATO, i.e. of the US.

EU has advantages and obvious disadvantages in this respect. The biggest advantage is that it represents a common strategic goal of all Balkan states, in fact the only goal that all of them share completely and without any reserve. EU is also a standard in every possible sense of that term, and the single biggest financial donor in the Balkans. Its clout in the Balkans is therefore beyond any competition. Through its conditionality policy, within which Balkan countries are progressing along the accession path depending on their compliance with certain conditions (that comprise or are compatible to security cooperation as well), the EU is capable of inserting an unprecedented influence on all countries and the whole region, as well.

On a more general level, the very enlargement of EU, on the table in the years to come, is going to have beneficial consequences in the realm of security. Such consequences are going to be felt on EU´s new borders, too, and beyond them - through the Balkans.

As for disadvantages, the most striking one is that its CESDP is still to become a reality, and EU is still to become a security partner to US within NATO, capable of matching extraordinary US military capabilities. Even the closest goal of establishing 60,000 strong rapid reaction forces in 2003 does not seem completely certain today, not only because of the reluctance in some member states, but also in the light of the most recent US plan to have rapid reaction forces within NATO as well, as an answer to the terrorism-related threats.

In addition, all current candidates for the EU membership, together with many Balkan nations, are not in favour of ceasing considering NATO as the main security guarantor. Neither they are willing to sacrifice their prospective NATO membership in exchange for EU plans that are still to be turned into reality. That attitude does not, however, contradict the basic idea of CESDP - that the EU will act when NATO does not want to act. On the other hand, one could predict with a great deal of certainty that, as already announced, US will continue to reduce its presence in the Balkans. Security in the Balkans, and security cooperation between the countries, will thus, volens-nolens, increasingly going to become a predominantnly EU affair, among strongly EU-oriented Western Balkan countries that can hardly become NATO members in the coming period. At that point CESDP could move on from its present modest basis to new previouosly unexplored areas.

In such a constellation, the need for cooperation between various international organizations involved in the region will be even more obvious. The cooperation should first of all connect in a more binding and institutionalized way two key organizations, EU and NATO, but this time on the topic of the Balkans. Security could be intertwined with economy and politics in this way, through a new institution, the basis of which is today´s Stability Pact. The Pact´s further independent existence, despite its obvious dependance on basically EU and NATO, is not needed any longer. Stability Pact should become part of the EU structure, or should be transformed into a liaison office between EU and NATO that would deal with the Balkans. Such an arrangement could enable a more appropriate choice of strategies and actors, and considerably improve coordination and efficiency. It could become a true motor for the completion of the security community in the Balkans.